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Introduction 
What does it mean to recreate Chinese antiquity in contemporary France? Does it mean 
resuscitating the experience of ancient Chinese literature and its ideas so that they can be 
somehow re-lived in the modern French language? Or, if we take 'recreation' in the sense of a 
recreational activity, would that mean treating Chinese antiquity as raw material for the 
author of this recreational act, and his potential French audience? These are the questions 
about re-appropriating Chinese antiquity which Pascal Quignard (1948-) poses. Quignard 
studied philosophy under Emmanuel Levinas and is one of the most distinguished and 
prolific contemporary French writers and artists. His most famous works include the novel 
Tous les matins du monde (1991), adapted later into a film by Alain Corneau, and the 
essayistic book Les Ombres errantes (2002), winner of the Prix Goncourt. But Quignard's 
creative output also spreads across an incredibly wide range of works including fiction, 
scholarly editions, philosophical essays, artworks, and theatre productions. Notably, Quignard 
is also a sinophile, and explicitly acknowledges that 'la Chine ancienne' is close to his heart 
(Quignard 2012: 4). This is evidenced by his numerous references to pre-modern Chinese 
literature and writers, particularly in his essayistic and non-fictional writings such as his 
scholarly prefaces, Petits traités,iSur le doigt qui montre cela, Rhétorique spéculative, and the 
series Dernier Royaume (with its ninth volume Mourir de penser published in 2014). These 
works form the scope of examination of this essay, which explores how Quignard's ancient 
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Chinese sources are reworked into his writing to reflect on his lasting fascination with style, 
philosophical thought, language, and antiquity. 
 Quignard's sinophilia is different from the established French sinophilic tradition 
spanning twentieth-century figures including Michaux, Saint-John Perse, Segalen, and 
stretching back to earlier advocates of Chinese literature and culture such as Judith Gautier 
and Voltaire. As this essay will argue, Quignard's engagement with Chinese antiquity 
involves particular ways of re-interpreting and re-writing ancient Chinese texts, and has a 
distinctly recreative aspect that is characteristic of the contemporary production of literature 
and arts. Simultaneously, Quignard's Chinese-inspired works raise important questions about 
reception and the relation between French Orientalism and cultural appropriation, which 
provides the bigger framework of cultural politics where I situate Quignard. Now more than 
ever, much debate is sparked off by the ethics and politics of how the West represents non-
Occidental cultures. Classic examples are the contested question of 'Chineseness' in Pound's 
Cathay poems, and the exoticist idealization of the Far-East in French travel writings from 
Claudel's Livre sur la Chine to Barthes's Empire des signes and Kristeva's Des Chinoises. A 
more recent example is the controversy in 2015 over the 'kimono Wednesdays' hosted by 
Boston's Museum of Fine Arts, where visitors were invited to pose in a kimono before 
Monet's La Japonaise.ii Understandably, when the contention about who should claim 
legitimacy over cultural interpretation and representation is so intense today, in the case of a 
contemporary French writer's creative recycling of a foreign and temporally remote culture 
such as Chinese antiquity, even more difficulties arise. There are voices emphatically arguing 
against such cultural appropriation, especially from an 'Occidentalist' perspective, which is 
seen by some cultural insiders as a 'strategy' to counter the Orientalist imperialism of cultural 
outsiders, as Ning Wang notes (1997: 62). In this essay, Quignard's sinophilia will be 
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discussed in relation to this discursive battlefield of Orientalism and appropriation, for we 
need to understand the nature of Quignard's engagement with Chinese literary sources rather 
than make sweeping judgments that slot him conveniently into the category of Eurocentric 
exoticism. 
 This approach to Quignard is pertinent because it addresses two problems. First, the 
scarcity of criticism on Quignard and his Chinese influences, which is partly because the 
majority of Quignard's works are untranslated. Existing scholarship on Quignard happens 
almost exclusively within the study of French literature, by mostly Francophone critics rather 
than Anglophone, who understandably lack Chinese expertise and have rarely studied in-
depth Quignard's Chinese references (with the few exceptions of Philippe Postel and Bruno 
Blanckeman, who work on comparative literature).iii The other group of critics who could 
examine Quignard's sinophilia, namely, sinologists, do not get to know Quignard well due to 
the lack of translation and different disciplinary concerns. This critical gap and lack of 
interaction between French and Chinese studies is what I hope to slightly remedy here. The 
second problem I address is the view – typical of sinologists – that Western writers like 
Quignard who produce works inspired by Chinese literature and culture should be viewed 
suspiciously as problematic cultural appropriators who do not say anything significant about 
Chinese culture itself. René Etiemble, who on the one hand was a firm advocate for cross-
cultural comparison, famously scoffed at French sinophiles from Claudel, Pedretti, to Artaud, 
Masson, and Michaux, sarcastically contrasting their great enthusiasm for Chinese culture 
with their superficial and incorrect knowledge of it (Etiemble 1961). Although Eric Hayot 
argued perceptively (1999: 530) when discussing Pound's Cathay that it is important to 
'establish a history of the West’s representations of China', and Michelle Bloom (2015: 5) 
demonstrated how Sino-French cross-imaginaries 'deserv[e] a place in French and 
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Francophone Studies, [and] Chinese studies', such a history that features Chinese-inspired 
writers like Pound and Quignard is yet to be taken seriously in comparative studies and its 
relevance to Chinese studies yet to be recognized. The present essay re-affirms this thread of 
investigation into Western imaginaries of Chinese culture and argues that Quignard's 
sinophilic works provide a new way of understanding such appropriations. To do this, instead 
of probing the question of whether Quignard steered clear of cultural misunderstandings and 
misuses, I show firstly that his engagement with Chinese antiquity centres on the notion of 
recreation rather than historicist and linguistic understanding; and secondly, that his 
recreative practices are, despite their ahistoricity and blurring of reality and fiction, 
nonetheless important because they provide food for critical thought. Thus we may refine our 
understanding of Quignard's sinophilic practices and think about what to appreciate in them 
and what questions they provoke, and recognize how Quignard's case contributes to the 
broader question of the contemporary reception of Chinese antiquity. 
 
Re-reading ancient Chinese texts 
Quignard's readerly and writerly processes are inextricably intertwined and his extensive 
reading on Chinese literature and thought is reworked into his own writing. From Sur le 
doigt, Petits traités, to Dernier Royaume, Quignard displays an impressive range of 
references to pre-modern Chinese texts and writers, including: the Daoist classics – the 
Zhuangzi (c. 4th-3rdC BCE), Laozi (c. 5th-3rdC BCE), Liezi (c.4thC BCE-4thC CE?), 
Huainanzi (2ndC BCE); early Chinese thinkers Gongsun Long, Mencius, Confucius; imperial 
historians Sima Qian and Zhang Shoujie; Tang literati – Han Yu, Wang Wei, Wang Changling, 
Li Bai, Li Shangyin. Besides these illustrious figures from antiquity, Quignard also alludes to 
early modern Chinese writers Pu Songling, Cao Xueqin, Wu Jingzi, the erotic novel Jin Ping 
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Mei (1610), and demonstrates knowledge of modern Chinese writers such as Lu Xun and 
sinologists such as Feng Youlan, Alfred Forke, Marcel Granet, and François Jullien.iv The 
abundance and range of Quignard's allusions – to Chinese and non-Chinese cultures alike – 
are crucial to his image as an erudite 'homme du livre' (Quignard 2011: para.29). This style of 
abundant referencing relates to Quignard's admiration for the late-Tang poet Li Yi-chan (or Li 
Shangyin, 813-858), whose biography Quignard wrote in his scholarly preface to Georges 
Bonmarchand's French translation of Li's Notes (1992). Termed zazuan (襍纂) in Chinese, this 
is a book of lists by Li that collects miscellaneous jottings in the form of a poetic catalogue: 
e.g. '14. Signes de richesse', '17. Choses agaçantes', '21. Choses vaines'. In the preface 
Quignard highlights Li's erudite style (in Li 1992: 19-20):  
Il passait pour être un poète érudit et difficile. […] Li Yi-chan ne composait 
jamais sans compulser nombre de documents de référence et on lui avait donné 
pour ce motif le sobriquet de 'T'a tsi yu'. T'a tsi yu veut dire la loutre qui rend 
hommage aux poissons. Les anciens Chinois disaient que la loutre avait 
l'habitude d'aligner le produit de sa pêche dans la boue de la berge et de le 
contempler avant de s'en nourrir. 
   
[He came across as an erudite and difficult poet. […] Li Shangyin never 
composed without poring over numerous reference materials and for this 
reason he was nicknamed 'ta-ji-yu'. Ta-ji-yu denotes the otter paying homage to 
fish. The ancient Chinese said that the otter had the habit of lining up the fruits 
of its fishing in the mud on the riverbank to gaze upon before feeding on 
them.]v 
The Chinese idiom ta-ji-yu (獺祭魚), used by the scholar Wu Jiong to describe Li's style, 
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establishes a striking analogy between the otter that lays out its prey as if counting its 
treasures and the writer who lists a kaleidoscopic range of references in his own works. The 
expression therefore figuratively denotes a writing style of erudition and proliferation, 
characteristic of Li and likewise of Quignard. The character ji (祭) is particularly relevant to 
Quignard, for it means 'to offer sacrifice', 'pay tribute to something sacred', 'hold sacrificial 
meat', 'kill (ritualistically)', and combines both notions of veneration and violence. This aptly 
portrayals Quignard's attitude to his admired ancient Chinese texts and writers: by 
incorporating them into his own writing, he pays homage to them while simultaneously 
devouring them as 'prey' to nourish himself.  
 This cannibalizing incorporation takes place not only through profuse citations in 
Quignard's texts but also through Quignard slipping into the style of his favourite Chinese 
writers. For example, the style of the miscellaneous list in Li's zazuan, which Quignard (in Li 
1992: 10) sees as 'une façon particulière et harcelante de jouer avec l'univers qui entoure et de 
jouer avec le langage qui le dissocie' ('a particular and provocative way of playing with one's 
surrounding world and with language that decomposes this world'). These 'listes-répertoires' 
appeal to Quignard because they combine the fragmentary, reflective, and taxonomical 
aspects of writing, without any unifying conclusion. Lists therefore open up to the 'joy' of 
proliferating the world's myriad facets, which Quignard finds not only in Li Shangyin but 
also in Li Bai's poetry (2002: 51) and the classical Japanese poet Sei Shonagon's zuihitsu, i.e. 
'au courant du pinceau' ('following the brush') (PT.VII: XLIV), the literary genre directly 
inspired by Li Shangyin.vi This list style re-emerges in Quignard's own works, for instance in 
Sordidissimes, citations are often presented as lists, e.g. Chapter 'Le 19 mars 2000 à Mons' 
(2005: 83-9), and in various chapters that enumerate lists of lists (Ibid: 157-58; 246; 256-7). 
Quignard's Petits traités also echo Li Shangyin's zazuan lists and Shonagon's zuihitsu by 
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combining essayistic fragments, personal reflections, anecdotes, and micro-fictions. The slim 
pamphlet-like format of Petits traités also resembles Chinese xiuzhen (袖珍) booklets, – 
carrying the connotation of treasured personal writings found in Li Shangyin, – which 
Quignard self-reflexively alludes to (PT.III: 125): 'Dans les vêtements des anciens Chinois les 
manches étaient très larges […]. Ils y rangeaient de menus objets, […] un jade, et des livres 
de petit format appelés ''joyaux de manche''' ('The ancient Chinese wore clothes with very big 
sleeves […]. In these sleeves people stored various small items, […] a jade, and small format 
books called ''sleeve jewels'' [i.e. xiuzhen]).  
 The style of Petits traités, observed by many critics as uncategorisable (Blanckeman 
2008; Holter 2017), embodies the 'non-genre' that Quignard (2001: 163) seeks. A hybrid of 
essay and fiction, lists and stories, this simultaneously intimate and abstract stylistics 
continues in Quignard's Dernier Royaume books. This free style owes to zazuan but also, 
notably, to the Zhuangzi, which is Quignard's favourite and most quoted Chinese source. 
Zhuangzi – the alleged author of the text by the same name – is one of Quignard's 
acknowledged key 'masters': 'Les Petits traités sont l'impôt payé à mes maîtres' ('Little 
Treatises are the tribute paid to my masters') (Quignard 1995: 153); 'Mes maîtres sont: […] 
Tchouang-tseu, Lucrèce' ('My masters are […] Zhuangzi, Lucretius') (Ibid: 157). Petits traités 
and Dernier Royaume also stylistically echo the Zhuangzi, for the Chinese text is a syncretist 
collection of passages and fragments organised notionally into chapters, encompassing 
myths, stories, dialogues, abstract arguments, enigmatic and religious-sounding utterances. 
Simultaneously one of the most poetic and most philosophical texts in Chinese literature, the 
Zhuangzi proves to be an important lesson for Quignard. His Rhétorique spéculative refuses 
the distinction between fiction and philosophy to reach towards Zhuangzi's 'paroles 
révélatrices, […] l'association libre, la langue dénormée, l'énigme, […] possèdent un pouvoir 
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évocateur dont la portée est illimitée./Cette affirmation de Tchouang-tseu est l'axiome de la 
rhétorique spéculative' ('revelatory words, […] free association, de-normalized language, 
enigma, [...] possess an evocative power the significance of which is boundless./This 
affirmation of Zhuangzi is the premise of speculative rhetoric')(Quignard 2010: 205). For 
Quignard, Zhuangzi's extravagant language and unbridled imagination re-ignite 'la 
mystagogie originaire que la philosophie a oubliée […] cet étrange nœud papillon' ('the 
primary mystagogy which philosophy has forgotten […] this strange butterfly problem') 
(Quignard 2014: 111), – referring to Zhuangzi's famous butterfly dream, where Zhuangzi asks 
himself whether he dreamt of being a butterfly or he is a butterfly dreaming it was Zhuangzi 
(Zhuangzi 2.14).  
 Thus, Quignard's Zhuangzian inspiration leads to his self-perception as a Daoist in 
spirit, since it was by reading the Zhuangzi that he came to unburden himself from his 
identity as a writer: 
‘Moi, je ne me considère pas comme écrivain.’ […]  
C'est de nouveau la persistance querelle entre les taoïstes et les confucéens. 
Confucius veut un rôle social, siéger auprès du prince, modéliser la vertu, 
édicter le rite, […] etc. Tchouang-tseu ne veut exercer aucune sorte de rôle. 
Dès qu'un prince fait appel à lui, il s'enfuit. […] Bref il y a ceux qui veulent 
des rôles, le titre d'écrivain, de philosophe, même le salaire qui va avec, etc. Et 
ceux qui veulent le moins de rôle possible. 
J'ai été confucéen et je suis devenu taoïste. (Quignard 2001: 119-20) 
   
  [Me, I don't consider myself a writer. […] 
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Again it is the persistent dispute between Daoists and Confucians. Confucius 
wants a social role, to take a position beside the ruler, formulate virtues, enact 
rites, [...] etc. Zhuangzi does not want to perform any role. As soon as a prince 
summons him, he runs away. […] In short, there are those who want roles, the 
title of writer, philosopher, even the salary that goes with it, etc. And there are 
those who want as little of any role as possible. 
  I was Confucian but I became Daoist.] 
Quignard sees in Zhuangzi the refusal to fulfil a function or title, otherwise crucial to the 
rectification of names and social roles (zhengming) in Confucian morality. Quignard refers to 
the story of Zhuangzi turning down the offer from the Prince of Chu to serve as minister 
(Zhuangzi 17.11) and translates this rejection into his own rejection of the professional 
identity of writer, aspiring to write without being a writer. This apparent paradox in Quignard 
finds an analogy in the Zhuangzi's expressions about wanting to speak without words: 
言無言，終身言，未嘗言；終身不言，未嘗不言。(Zhuangzi 27.1) 
[To speak without words: even if you have spoken all your life, you would 
have said nothing; even if all your life you have not spoken, you would have 
never stopped saying something.] 
This sentence expresses the kind of paradox that Quignard poses: to 'speak' without words, to 
write without being a writer. Here, Zhuangzi plays on the double-entendre of the term yan, 
which is both a noun denoting 'words, language, theories, or writings that expound one's 
views' and a verb for 'to speak, discuss'. This ambiguity enables different understandings of 
how one may 'yan-wu-yan', i.e. 'to yan (express one's views, or convey meaning) without yan 
(speech, theoretical writings)', and vice versa 'to yan (speak, verbally expound, theorise) 
without yan (conveying meaning, expressing one's opinions, or attaching significance to one's 
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words)'. Yan-wu-yan parallels Quignard's 'silence parlant' (PT.I: 35), referring to Jerome's 
silentium eloquens to assert that 'toute œuvre écrite […] est un silence qui parle' ('all written 
works […] are a silence that speaks'). 'Parler', like Zhuangzi's yan, paradoxically includes 
both sound and silence since it means both '(orally) speak' and more figuratively, 
'express/signify (without oral speech and its sound)'. Writing therefore 'speaks' through its 
silent linguistic expression that conveys meaning. These twists of language and meaning – in 
both Zhuangzi and Quignard – converge towards the Zhuangzian preference for the un-
selfconscious action and experience of something over gaining acknowledgement for it, over 
achieving a certain desired result from such action, or defining the significance of the action 
so that it is codified.vii This is why Quignard feels more connected to Zhuangzi than 
Confucius because he considers his own refusal of the label of 'writer' as a Daoist gesture in 
the sense that he is concerned about the engagement with the activity and process of writing 
rather than official recognition for it, its static definition as an identity, and any authorial 
attachment to his writings that reifies their expressions and forces him to assume the writer's 
('auteur') responsibility (Vuong 2016: 45) for their interpretation. In the end, why does 
Quignard continue writing despite not wanting to be a writer? He provides the answer 
himself, which evokes Zhuangzi's 'speaking without words' again: 'J'ai écrit pour survivre. J'ai 
écrit parce que c'était la seule façon de parler en se taisant' (I wrote to survive. I wrote 
because it was the only way to speak while being silent) (Quignard 1993: 64-5). If writing is 
an existential matter as natural and necessary as breathing for Quignard (i.e. an un-
selfconscious act, as Zhuangzi would see it), certainly it needs no other justification.viii  
Quignard's interest in classical Chinese texts also stems from his desire to probe into 
ideas about language, particularly the question of how ancient languages may enrich our 
understanding of the nature of language in general. Quignard believes that, like other ancient 
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languages such as Greek and Akkadian, classical Chinese contributes to the fascinating 
‘ecstasy' of language that writing (rather than speech) facilitates (Quignard 2001: 103). This 
linguistic abandonment is expressed prominently through the argumentative style of classical 
Chinese philosophical texts, which heavily uses aphorisms, paradoxes, and pairs of analogies 
and contrasts. The richly ambivalent linguistic style and often obscure context of meaning of 
classical Chinese rhetoric appeal to Quignard's aesthetic and literary sensibilities, which 
explains his particular appreciation for Daoist literature and Gongsun Long, a skilled 
rhetorician around 4thC BCE who was notorious for sophistic arguments. For instance, 
Quignard cites the Daoist text Liezi to illustrate his own views: 
Tout ce qui se dit n'est pas tout, prétend Lie-tseu. Tout ne se dit pas. […] Ce 
qui naît du son, cela s'entend, mais ce par quoi le son se produit n'a jamais 
retenti. Ainsi disait Lie-tseu. Aussi bien Aristote. (PT.II: 30) 
 
[All that is said is not all, Liezi claims. All is not said. […] That which is born 
from sound is heard, but that by which sound is produced is never heard. Thus 
said Liezi, as did Aristotle.] 
If we read the Liezi comparatively with Quignard, the sentences closest in meaning to 
Quignard's citation are found in section 1.3: '聲之所聲者聞矣，而聲聲者未嘗發' (that which is 
sounded by sound can be heard, but that which makes sound heard is never manifest); and in 
section 4.5: '得意者无言, [...] 用无言為言亦言' (Those who have grasped the meaning do not 
speak, […] to use not-speaking as speaking is still speaking). When compared to the original 
text of Liezi, we see that Quignard's quotes are loose paraphrases, though the sentence about 
sound is more accurate. The parallel between Liezi and Aristotle also seems quite casual, for 
whether Aristotle's views on sound can be summarised in this way is highly debatable. This 
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way of juxtaposing different references by loose citation, as Postel observes (in Détrie 2001: 
330), is a deliberate stylistic strategy which Quignard calls the 'court-circuit' ('short-circuit'). 
It aims at making the citation the 'object of an ''amplifying'' endeavour' (Ibid: 327), which 
reflects Quignard's view that the author is in fact an auctor – one who 'accentuates' and re-
invigorates the work of ancients instead of creating her own original works or respecting the 
historicity of ancient texts (Gorrillot 2009: 72). The 'short-circuit' way in creating loose 
paraphrases and comparisons, in the case of this Liezi quote, shows that Quignard's 
appreciation for the Liezi does not involve demonstrating a close-reading of the Chinese text 
to understand its precise wording or semantic context, but focuses on the ideas which the text 
sparks off. Perhaps, Quignard deliberately attempts to obfuscate the reality of the original 
Liezi to surreptitiously mirror the fact that the Liezi's reality and originality have always been 
questioned by Chinese scholars, – the text being of uncertain date, apocryphal, and accused 
of being a fake text written in the Six Dynasties (220-589) to masquerade as a genuine early 
Chinese text. In light of this, Quignard's 'short-circuit' treatment of the Liezi can even be 
understood as a witty way to obliquely comment on the fictional and deceptive origins of the 
Liezi itself. 
 Quignard's inspiration from Gongsun Long is demonstrated in his reflections on the 
nature of language and its relation to the world of concrete objects and experience. To begin 
with, he professes that 'une des pensées à laquelle je dois le plus est celle de Kong-souen 
Long' ('one of the thought systems to which I owe most is that of Gongsun Long') (1993: 78). 
In 1990, despite claiming to have extremely limited knowledge of classical Chinese, 
Quignard published Sur le doigt qui montre cela, his own annotated translation of Gongsun's 
notoriously difficult Discourse on Pointing at Things (Zhiwulun 指物論), which includes 
abstruse arguments about the philosophy of language, nominalism, and using language to 
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classify things in the world. What to make of this translation of Gongsun's text when 
Quignard claims, at the end of his long preface to his translation, to know no Chinese (1990: 
15): 'Je ne sais pas parler le chinois. D'ailleurs je ne comprends plus aucune langue étrangère' 
('I cannot speak Chinese. Moreover I do not understand any foreign language')?ix In a later 
interview, Quignard (2001: 136) reveals that he received help in translation from 'un ami 
Chinois persécuté, dont je cache le nom' ('a persecuted Chinese friend, whose name I keep 
secret'). By deliberately hiding the identity of this Chinese collaborator, whose presence 
would suggest more authenticity in the translation, Quignard undercuts the reality of this 
collaborative translation and makes one wonder if this 'friend' is entirely fictional. Judging 
from the text of Sur le doigt, which includes Quignard's preface, translation, and 
supplementary annotations, we perceive a tension between Quignard's scholarly exegesis and 
translation and his creative re-reading and rewriting of Gongsun's text. On the one hand, 
Quignard's translation is based on his consultation of various sinologists' interpretations and 
translations of Zhiwulun, especially Ignace Kou Pao-Koh's Deux Sophistes chinois: Houei 
Che et Kong-souen Long (1953). Quignard also elaborates on, – in typically philological 
fashion, – the difficulties of translating the term zhi 指, literally meaning 'finger', but 
interpreted disparately as 'attributs', 'pronoms', 'ce qui indique', 'définitions', 'signe' (Quignard 
1990: 8). Quignard states (1990: 9) that he translated zhi in the most 'concrete sense' of 'doigt' 
(finger), which is the meaning supported, as he argues, by the Zhuangzi's parodic reference to 
Gongsun (Zhuangzi 2.6). Quignard's annotations of particular phrases and sentences in small 
print following his translation reproduce the typical presentation of pre-modern Chinese texts 
where comments are incorporated in small print after the main text. These features show 
Quignard's substantial work in reading commentaries and sinological studies to produce his 
translation. On the other hand, the fictional and creative aspect of Quignard's approach to 
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Gongsun is also strongly present. At one point in his preface, after a long citation presumably 
by Gongsun, Quignard ends by stating that this quote is false (1990: 12): 'Kong-souen Long 
dit: ''Ne confondez pas. […] Tout est indescriptible.'' J'invente ces mots.' ('Gongsun Long 
says: ''Do not confuse. […] Everything is indescribable.'' I am inventing these words.') This 
invented quote implies a fictionality in his interpretation of Gongsun. Moreover, Quignard 
unconventionally translates the term wu 物, – usually translated as 'thing, being', – as 'cela' 
(that/this), which significantly changes the interpretation of the whole text, e.g. the first 
sentence '物莫非指/wu mo fei zhi' (Gongsunlongzi 3.1), compare Quignard's translation 'Tout 
cela est un doigt' ('All that is a finger') with 'Of concrete things, none are not objects of 
reference' (Cheng and Swain 1970: 140) and Reding's (2002: 195) 'Every pointing is at 
something'. This interpretive stretch in translating culturally specific and often considered 
untranslatable terms is typical of Quignard, e.g. when he suggests that the German 'ersatz' 
would be a good translation for 'brahman' in Sanskrit (2002: 70). 
 Sur le doigt is paradoxically, therefore, a pseudo-translation that tries to be faithful – 
an inevitably illusory fidelity because the original meaning of Zhiwulun is exceptionally 
uncertain. Quignard shows understanding of the gist of the problem posed by Gongsun – 
consensual among diverse critics of Gongsun, – which is the difference between linguistic 
referentiality and the order of real things.x This question, in the context of French literature 
and thought, immediately refers to Saussurean semiotics and perhaps Levinas's legacy on 
Quignard, particularly Levinas's view that 'the signifier […] is not signified' and 'cannot be 
articulated' (Kozin 2004: 237). Here, in relation to Gongsun, Quignard further reflects on this 
question by taking seriously Gongsun's crucial distinction between the 'finger that points' and 
the 'act of pointing/referring' (1990: 14): 'le doigt devient double, le cela devient deux (chose 
et mot), tout cela est voilà, et le doigt cesse d'être le doigt' ('the finger becomes double, the 
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'that' [it points to] becomes two (thing and word), all 'that' is 'there it is', and the finger ceases 
being the finger'). This directly refers to Gongsun's argument (Gongsunlongzi 3.1-9) about 
linguistic reference in which he tries to show how the linguistic sign used to refer to 
something in reality is often confused with the real thing it refers to.xi Nevertheless, 
Quignard's approach to Gongsun is deliberately liberated from – though not unrelated to – its 
historical and linguistic context. For instance, Quignard later misquotes Gongsun (1993: 79): 
'''Il existe des pensées qui dérivent de nulle part''. ''Il y a des méditations sans aboutissement.'' 
('''There are thoughts that derive from nowhere.' '''There are reflections without any 
outcome.'''). These two propositions are absent in the entire text by Gongsun, nor can 
anything close to them be found. Perhaps Quignard is using 'l'association libre' here, and 
cannibalizing Gongsun as the 'prey' of his reading exercise, since reading is 'la relation entre 
le prédateur et sa proie' ('the relationship between the predator and its prey') (PT.VIII: 18), 
just like hunting. Gongsun's text is significant to Quignard because it ultimately serves as a 
springboard for his own views about the indeterminateness of philosophical thought. 
 But why choose Gongsun rather than other early Chinese thinkers who are easier to 
understand and better known than Gongsun for this translational endeavour? Quignard 
himself offers an explanation (1990: 8): 'Le Tche-wou Louen, depuis vingt-trois siècles, a été 
considéré comme le plus obscur de ces textes qui comptent parmi les plus obscurs' 
('Zhiwulun, for twenty-three centuries, has been considered the most obscure of the most 
obscure texts'). Precisely because of Zhiwulun's difficulty and impenetrability, Quignard 
chooses to excavate meaning from it, so that its signification further lapses into an infinite 
regress of enigmas. This reflects on Quignard's pronounced interest – noted by Vuong (2016) 
and Jean-Louis Pautrot (2007) – in re-examining esoteric and forgotten ancient texts, not only 
Zhiwulun but also the Hellenistic poet Lycophron's Alexandra, described as 'σκοτεινόν' (dark, 
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obscure).xii Quignard's act of translating and producing a re-reading of these abstruse texts 
from antiquity therefore reaches into the darkness of the past and ultimately of death itself: 
'Quand on traduit, la langue la plus souple, la plus vivante, […] la plus sagace est la morte' 
('In translation, the most flexible, liveliest, […] and wisest language is the dead one') (PT.II: 
20). The vitality of esoteric language – the meaning of which is concealed even in its original 
language – in translation is the vitality of death, where meaning is constantly reborn but 
always escapes into the black-hole of meaninglessness. Sur le doigt thus attests to Quignard's 
orphic quest for the origins of significance that ends up in language and signification forever 
slipping away from the grasping 'hand':  
Tout ce qui est saisi est une main. Le langage est une main. […] Le sujet est 
une main vouée à prendre et à comprendre. (Quignard 1990: 10) 
Je reste avec, à la main, le doigt de Kong-souen Long, […] On ne voit jamais 
assez le doigt, […] avec lequel on montre. […] Autant que nous parlons, le 
langage est l'énigme. (Ibid: 34) 
 
[All that is grasped is a hand. Language is a hand. […] The subject is a hand 
predestined to take and to understand. [...] 
As for the hand, I remain with Gongsun Long's finger, […] We never see 
enough of the finger, […] with which we point. […] So far as we speak, 
language is enigma.] 
 
Philosophizing about language via classical Chinese  
As mentioned above, Quignard finds in classical Chinese texts an 'ecstasy' of language. This 
view stems from Quignard's interest in the philosophy of language and how so-called ‘dead’ 
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languages can enrich our ideas about language. The 'ecstasy' in writing and reading  is an 
affective power that can be instantiated in many different languages and writers, in 
Quignard's view (2001: 103), in Zhuangzi as well as Eckhart, Hadewijch, and Chateaubriand; 
in ancient as well as modern languages. In other words, this ecstatic style lies in particular 
ways of speaking and writing, and in an aestheticisation of language, which can happen 
regardless of whether the language in question is considered dead or not. This shows, 
according to Quignard, that ancient languages are not more 'dead' than the current modern 
languages. Quignard explicitly rejects the common assumption that ancient languages are 
dead and irrelevant to our contemporary life, arguing surprisingly that language itself is 
neither dead nor living, and that the interest of a language is not in the need to use it. 
Le langage ne répond pas à un besoin. Son usage ne remplit pas une fonction. 
Le langage dit plus qu'il n'est besoin qu'on dise. 
  Il n'y a pas de langues qui soient en vie. Il n'y a pas de langues mortes. (PT.II: 
  13-4) 
 
[Language does not respond to any need. Its use does not fulfil any function. 
Language says more than it is necessary to say. 
There are no living languages. There are no dead languages.] 
This anachronistic and anti-functionalist view of language thus radically levels antiquity with 
contemporaneity, resulting in that antiquity becomes as significant to new investigation and 
thought as contemporary culture and life. This is in line with Quignard's view that all written 
languages are a very recent invention seen in the big picture of the history of human existence 
(PT.III: 55). This is why he compares classical Chinese to other ancient languages and argues 
that, although it is radically different from languages like Sanskrit or Phoenician, it is part of 
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the advent of writing that signals the prostheticisation of language that makes language 
external to the human body and increasingly alienated from human existence. This prosthetic, 
technological dimension of written language is one of the most important commonalities that 
connects different ancient scripts and languages to each other as well as to modern languages.
 
 
In addition to understanding ancient languages under this new light and thus making 
them contemporary to us, Quignard considers ancient languages more interesting than the 
modern because their remoteness and more pronounced obscurity excite our curiosity as a 
message written in secret code would. This shroud of mystery reminds us of the hieroglyphic 
and shamanic origins of language: 
L'étrangeté dans la graphie des langues anciennes, […] leur apparence 
extraordinaire ou bien leur inimaginable désuétude, [...] nous intrigue ou qui 
nous intimide comme quelque chose d'un peu 'sacré', 'sacrifié'. (PT.II: 35) 
 
[The strangeness in the script of ancient languages, […] their extraordinary 
appearance or their unimaginable obsoleteness, [...] intrigues or intimidates us 
like something carrying connotations of the 'sacred' or 'sacrificed'.] 
For Quignard, the intimidating power of language manifests itself in the fact that we human 
beings necessarily depend on language for our actions and constitute our identity through it, 
although language is a system of codes that has nothing human about them, just like 
algorithms for machine reading. In this sense, human beings are like materials onto which the 
linguistic code is imprinted and rendered readable and meaningful. Thus, human beings are 
'sacrificed' to language: 
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Nous nous sommes 'offerts' à la langue. Notre corps est ce 'cadeau' que les 
livres nous font. Il nous revient des livres: contre-don de l'échange de notre 
corps sacrifié à la langue. (PT.II: 90) 
 
[We 'offer' ourselves to language. Our body is this 'gift' that books give us. It 
comes back to us from books: the counter-gift of the exchange for our body 
that is sacrificed to language.] 
In Quignard's view, the strangeness of ancient languages makes us more aware of our 
helplessness before this prosthetic, code-encrypting, and non-human aspect of all language. 
This brings us to realise that even our mother tongue, seen as 'alive' and close to us, and over 
which we assume to exercise control, is still non-human and exacts a sacrifice. This human 
sacrifice to language happens in the way that the mother tongue inscribes itself into our very 
being – our bodies' behaviour, our emotions, thoughts, and social relations. Stripped of our 
mother tongue, we would be fundamentally changed. For instance, when we are in a foreign 
place where our mother tongue is not understood, the linguistic barrier obliges us to act as if 
our bodies and understanding are impaired; or, for patients who suffer from linguistic 
amnesia, their customary behaviour and thought are transformed in ways they cannot predict 
or control. The helplessness of human beings without their mother tongue reduces the human 
to this 'outis, l'animal inconnu' ('unrecognised animal') (Gorrillot 2009: 69), which shows 
that, rather than say we have control over our mother tongue, it is more true that our mother 
tongue controls us instead. Here, Quignard demonstrates a reverse functionalist view of 
language, in that humans are instruments used by language instead of language serving as an 
instrument for human use: 
L'homme n'est pas plus maître du langage que la terre n'est au centre des 
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galaxies et ne gouverne les planètes. (1993: 112) 
[Humanity is no more the master of language than the earth is the centre of the 
galaxies and rules all other planets.] 
 
Si je pense que ma langue maternelle me comprend, cela ne m'a jamais paru 
réciproque. (2001: 135) 
[If I think that my mother tongue understands me, this has never seemed to me 
to be reciprocal.] 
Human powerlessness before language is, for Quignard, a reflection that 'ce qui est vécu n'a 
pas le ''pas'' sur ce qui est artificiel, ou littéraire' ('lived experience does not prevail over the 
artificial and the literary'); and written language is precisely an artificiality because it is like 
'les choses nées de l'artifice, [...qui] n'ont aucune attache avec la vie, aucune avec la mort' 
('things that are born out of artifice, [...which] have absolutely no connection to life, as well 
as to death') (PT.III: 183). The mother language is no different from foreign languages in this 
aspect, and thus it is also alienated from us, providing no shelter. Through this realisation, we 
discover the primary foreignness of the mother tongue, and break the bubble of illusion about 
the unity, identity, and community constructed by the mother tongue. For Quignard, the 
mother tongue is not only foreign but also fragmented, because not only is there no universal 
language to unite all different languages, neither is there a unified language or even shared 
'silence' that unites internally each individual language (PT.II: 122). Everyone speaks a 
different language, and the infinite linguistic differentiations between individuals force each 
individual to float like monadic islands on the sea of languages: 
Chacun de ceux qui parlent ne peut être égalé ni à la somme ni à l'articulation 
d'un idiolecte 'intime' et d'une langue nationale 'convenue'. […] 
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Il n'y a pas […] une 'unité' de langue qui soit une ressource mise à leur 
disposition, ni une mesure indiscutable, ni même un référent 'national'. (PT.II: 
15-6) 
 
[Each individual of those who speak can be matched up to neither the sum of 
nor the junctures between an 'intimate' idiom and a 'consensual' national 
language. [...] 
There is no 'unity' of language that could be a resource available for people's 
use,  or an indisputable measure, or even a 'national' point of reference.] 
Languages are infinitely diverse on a microscopic level for Quignard. Despite the existence 
of linguistic consensus within linguistic spheres, consensus cannot be the basis for any 
continuity between different individual subjectivities. Therefore no language can bind people 
together as a ‘national language’ supposedly does. As Mitaut observes, Quignard sees an 
internal fragmentation and 'schizologie' in every language, – not only fragmented within the 
linguistic system such as having different registers and dialects of French, but also 
fragmented within each individual's personal use of French. Therefore, under the illusion of 
unity the mother tongue provides, in fact a 'matricide' of the mother language is always 
already carried out, because you can always ask 'Combien de langues dans une seule langue?' 
('How many languages are there in a single language?') (Mitaut 2008: 480). This is why 
Quignard professes to be alienated from his mother tongue, French. The flip side of this 
linguistic alienation, however, is that non-mother tongues and ancient languages become, on 
the contrary, less foreign and closer to us than they are supposed to be. As Quignard affirms 
(2012: 239): 'Les sociétés anciennes […] ne sont pas exotiques […] à celles qui en dérivent', 
and therefore antiquity is not more foreign than modernity, nor ancient languages more 
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remote than modern languages. Quignard's appreciation of classical Chinese can therefore be 
considered as his approximating himself to a remote non-mother tongue. If not even French 
constitutes any stable cultural identity or shelter of intimacy for Quignard, then Chinese 
becomes less radically Other despite its foreignness and non-Frenchness, because the 
fundamental alienation of all language levels out the degree of foreignness classical Chinese 
has in relation to modern French. 
 
Re-inventing Chinese antiquity  
It is understood now that Quignard's approach to Chinese antiquity is that of inventing the 
past rather than 'resurrecting' it, to which Quignard admits in an interview: 
Lapeyre-Desmaison: 'Dans Rhétorique spéculative vous montrez nettement 
que votre but n'est pas de ressusciter le passé. Votre travail consisterait donc en 
une invention du passé? 
Quignard: J'espère. Latron, Albucius, Kong-souen Long, Sénèque le père. 
(Quignard 2001: 127) 
 
[Lapeyre-Desmaison: 'In your Speculative Rhetoric you showed clearly that 
your aim is not to resurrect the past. Does your work therefore consist of an 
invention of the past?' 
Quignard: 'I hope so. Latro, Titus Albucius, Gongsun Long, Seneca the Elder'.] 
Besides carrying connotations of creativity and non-historicism, the term 'invention' also 
conveys strongly the ideas of discovery, imagination, and fiction. This fictional dimension of 
Quignard's sinophilic inventions is evidenced by the intellectual figures he often cites, who 
serve as personae in his imaginary theatre of co-existing antiquities and modernities. Fiction 
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masquerades as history and vice versa, as in the false historical figure of Geoffrey Meaume, 
the seventeenth-century French etcher invented by Quignard in Terrasse à Rome; and in 
Quignard's humorous biography of the Tang literatus Han Yu (2002: 95): 'Han Yu naquit en 
768, obtint son doctorat en 792' (Han Yu was born in 768 and received his PhD in 792'). Both 
dates are historically correct, except that Han obviously did not complete a PhD but passed 
the jinshi imperial examination in 792 after several attempts. Quignard's anachronistic use of 
the notion of 'doctorat' decontextualises the Chinese imperial exams and establishes an 
analogy which contemporary readers could understand. This playful manipulation of 
temporal consciousness also shows in Quignard's remark about Gongsun and Gorgias (2001: 
131): 'Ils vivaient dans le même temps, mais ils ne vivaient pas dans le même temps' ('They 
lived  at the same time, but they did not live at the same time') – which reads as a self-
contradiction. Here, Quignard is exploiting the interstices and overlaps between different 
notions of temporality such as contemporaneity, simultaneity, historical time, and 'le jadis' 
(the erstwhile). This temporal parallelism and juxtaposition may be understood through 
Quignard's view (2012: 283) that 'l'Histoire n'est pas linéaire parce que le temps […] est 
cyclique' ('History is not linear because time is cyclical'). This cyclical time-view aligns 
Quignard with ancient Chinese notions of dynastic time, especially the Grand Historian Sima 
Qian's historiography, where each dynasty repeats the circular temporal structure of rise and 
fall. In Quignard's view (2002: 232), Sima is not a 'grand sensitif du passé' ('neurotic of the 
past') because he manifests a 'mélancholie' of temporality that sabotages linear evolution. 
This melancholic, repetitive time thus orients itself towards what Quignard terms 'le jadis', 
the eternally resurgent time in the cycle of rebirth: 'Le jadis […] n'a pas encore fini de surgir' 
('The erstwhile […] has not yet finished arising') (Quignard 2012: 257); 'sans cesse le temps 
''commence de commencer''' ('time ''begins to begin'' endlessly') (Ibid, 259). The Quignardian 
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'jadis' is therefore outside time, not only transforming our understanding of time through a 
fundamentally 'mythic thought' (Pautrot 2003) about rebirth but also positing an ahistorical 
understanding of language, human existence, and the world. Measured against 'le jadis' that is 
constantly in statu nascendi, all temporalities are the same. Gongsun who lived around 320-
250 BCE did not live at the same historical time as Gorgias, who lived around 485-380 BCE ; 
but Gongsun and Gorgias are exactly parallel in relation to the constantly restarting 'jadis', i.e. 
one point that has no duration and is immobile. 
 Thus we understand Quignard's anachronism, as in 'il y a peu de différence entre 
quelques heures qui nous séparent d'autrui, et quelques millénaires' ('there is little difference 
between a few hours that separate us from others, and several millenia') (PT.II: 39). Are we 
really closer to our contemporaries than we are to the ancients? Does a contemporaneous 
relation between two things necessarily say something essential about them? Quignard asks 
(2001: 131): 
De quoi est-on contemporain? De la cafetière électrique qui est en train de 
bourdonner dans la cuisine? De la sexualité génitale? Du rayon de sol qui 
traverse la pièce?  
 
[With what are we contemporaneous? With the electric cafetière buzzing in the 
kitchen? With genital sexuality? With the ray of sunlight crossing the room?] 
The most ephemeral phenomena – boiling water bubbling for a few instants and sunlight 
passing through the room – can coincide temporally with human sexuality and the sun, which 
have existed since the distant past. Quignard proposes that the most ancient can be alive and 
contemporary, and vice versa. The Daoist sage Laozi, the 'Vieil Enfant' ('Old Child'), whom 
Quignard recurrently cites (2002: 193), embodies this coincidentia oppositorum between the 
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ancient and emergent contemporaneity because in Chinese hagiographical legends, Laozi was 
born an old man after 81 years in his mother's womb. 'Que le proche soit très lointain et le 
lointain extrêmement proche' ('May what is near be very distant and the distant be extremely 
near'), Quignard asserts (1994-5: para.11). His writing always points towards 'le jadis', 
atemporal and transhistorical experiences, and towards a language that 'redonn[e] vie aux 
expériences que ces siècles, en [la langue], ont lentement tissées' ('bring back to life the 
experiences that these centuries have gradually woven into language') (PT.IV: 111). The 
pleasure in thinking, reading, and manipulating language is therefore a transhistorical 
experience that is universal for both the ancient and modern:  
Plaisir de la pensée articulée. Plaisir du lecteur […] En langue grecque: 
spécifiquement les trois traités qui restent de Gorgias. Dans la vieille Chine: 
Kong-souen Long. À Rome: De Natura Rerum – de Titus Lucretius Carus. En 
langue française: Jean de la Fontaine. (Quignard 1990: 58) 
 
[The pleasure of articulated thought. The pleasure of the reader […] In the 
Greek language: the three extant treatises by Gorgias, in particular. In ancient 
China: Gongsun Long. In Rome: On the Nature of Things – by Titus Lucretius 
Carus. In the French language: Jean de la Fontaine.] 
These different writers – all known for extraordinary rhetoric and style – are posited in 
comparison and parallel to each other because Quignard thinks they all provide readerly 
pleasure by provoking thought. This deliberately constructed parallelism again highlights 
Quignard's generalist perspective. By giving a 'universal nature' to both Chinese and 
European writers (Postel in Detrie 2001, 335), Quignard strategically asserts fundamental 
commonality rather than difference between East and West. In this way, writers from 
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disparate cultures and historical eras are contemporary to each other because the 
commonality of experience that they evoke in today's reader – who does not belong to their 
historical contexts – makes them comparable, and therefore on a par. 
 Here, although Quignard's common framework for both Chinese and European 
thought may be criticised as an imposition of a Eurocentric, perhaps even typically French 
understanding of the universal on Chinese thought, one might also argue that Quignard's 
universalism breaks the Eurocentric bubble. If, as Jean Chesneaux argues (1996: 14), the 
seventeenth-century French philosophes who reconstructed China as a 'genuine philosophical 
universality […] for a world-wide approach to human nature' broke away 'from a Eurocentric 
view of world history, founded only on Greek and Roman cultures and on earlier Hebrew 
traditions', then Quignard is analogous to the philosophes. Because likewise, Quignard's 
taking recourse to Chinese antiquity as much as to the Classical tradition to inform his views 
on language and temporality precisely goes against the exoticization of China that insists it is 
absolutely different from Europe, and therefore of no significance to it except in re-affirming 
European self-identity. This universalist outlook enables Quignard to carry out comparative 
thinking between antiquity and modernity, to re-read classical Chinese texts and transform 
their relation to us. The use of a generalist comparative framework on non-Western cultures 
to understand them in relation to the West can therefore turn out, surprisingly, to be a method 
that is neither Eurocentric nor reductive. The sinologist Michael Puett points out in his 
foreword to Roberte Hamayon's Why We Play (2015: xvi-xvii) that 'it is precisely by not 
undertaking comparative studies that we are most at risk of recapitulating our ethnocentric 
biases. It is on the contrary through generalizing works [...] that we begin to alter our 
understandings'. Coming back to Quignard, therefore, his generalist and comparative 
consideration leads to a re-invention and renewal of Chinese antiquity and its ancient 
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language, which becomes an eternal return of the ancient as the new as well as the constant 
novelty that is disguised as the old. 
 We may now understand that Quignard is exemplary of a certain strand of twentieth-
century French sinophilia, namely, an aesthetically creative sinophilia that follows upon 
Segalen's track and can also be found in other French figures such as Balthus, Michaux, and 
Gerard Macé. Like them, Quignard is primarily interested in aesthetic forms extrapolated – 
even decontextualised – from Chinese antiquity, and how they can be recreatively used for 
literary experiments to reflect on his own concerns. Nevertheless, Quignard also attests to a 
significant change in the history of French Orientalism because he is devoid of Segalen's 
insistence on returning to the European Self. Compared to Segalen and to some extent 
Michaux, Quignard's main novelty is that he no longer has an idealized vision for the Far-
East that sees, in a reverse Orientalist way, Chinese antiquity as superior to Western 
modernity.xiii Quignard respects Chinese antiquity as an extremely rich and complex tradition 
in its own right, but does not rank it above other cultures or antiquities, for instance Heian 
Japan and classical India, which he frequently refers to through Shonagon, abbot Kenko, and 
the Rigveda.xiv Ancient China is simply one among the many antiquities that Quignard is 
interested in, and has no special status in providing remedies of 'wisdom', a 'holistic 
worldview', or an 'alternative non-logical rationality' in contrast to ancient Greece or modern 
Europe. These views of China, extending from Levy-Bruhl's 'Eastern mentalities' to 
sinologists such as Needham and Harbsmeier whom Adrian Chan criticises in his Orientalism 
in Sinology (2009), are notably absent from Quignard. Quignard's engagement with China 
and other Asian cultures is not a critical or political gesture to resist Eurocentrism, simply 
because Quignard is a cultural egalitarian and engages with both European and non-European 
cultures in a universalist way. He brings Chinese writing and thought into broad discussions 
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about literary style and the human relation to language, without insisting on any Chinese 
particularism that fetishizes Chinese antiquity as an irreducible Other to European thought 
and experience. In fact, Quignard's frequent juxtaposition of different Chinese references 
with a multitude of other references from different cultures and across timexv has a levelling 
effect that de-exoticizes and un-discriminates his Chinese references for his readers, who 
would tend to see these references as part of the erudite body of Quignard's influences rather 
than pick them out as indicators of any unique Chineseness. As Quignard declares (1995: 
139-40) 'Il n'y a pas d'Orient à ce monde./Ce monde est sans accueil' ('There is no Orient in 
this world./This world is groundless'). With Quignard, therefore, the kind of French 
Orientalism that perpetuates the fetish for the Far-Eastern Other – either in fearing or adoring 
it – can be said to have died. 
 We may now try to assess the merits and drawbacks of Quignard's sinophilia, for it 
highlights in particularly problematic and interesting ways the question of how to treat an 
ancient tradition to which one has no claims. On the one hand, we find several commendable 
aspects of Quignard's approach to Chinese antiquity. Firstly, Quignard's declared admiration 
for classical Chinese language and literature makes his readers (predominantly European) 
aware of the richness of the Chinese tradition. Quignard's avid attitude of learning towards 
Chinese and other non-European antiquities brings to the French public's attention esoteric 
ancient Chinese texts and thinkers such as Gongsun and the Liezi, which they would very 
likely not know about otherwise. Thus, Quignard's readers may develop an interest in 
Chinese culture and be led to engage with it on a deeper level. Secondly, Quignard's frequent 
references to Chinese and other non-European cultures go well beyond the European canon 
and break through Western writers' tendency to nourish themselves on and respond to 
exclusively European and Anglophone literary traditions. With Quignard, this is impossible, 
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because his encyclopedic range of inspirational sources affirms the need to think 
comparatively across different languages, literary traditions, cultures, and temporalities. This 
approach is also symptomatic of the conceptual death of the French Orientalist tradition 
mentioned above, and shows the uniqueness and paradoxical nature of Quignard's sinophilia 
as a love for Chinese antiquity without a fetishizing Chinese particularism. 
 Nevertheless, we can also view Quignard's sinophilia and general approach to 
antiquity more critically. To start with, Quignard's profuse referencing, – whether to Li 
Shangyin, Sîn-lēqi-unninni, or vedic literature, – has been criticised as a stylistic defect and 
misleading cultural appropriation by critics such as Mazzella and Blanckeman.xvi It gives the 
impression of superficially plucking references out of their historical contexts and bunching 
them together as illustrations of Quignard's own views or some 'invariable human behaviour', 
as Pautrot criticises (2003: 754). A specific example is when Quignard writes on his ideas 
about language and writing systems in Petits traités, he does not discuss any concrete 
linguistic details of any particular language, but cites fragmented and decontextualised 
etymologies from different languages to make generalisations. Secondly, there is the 
uncertainty about Quignard's linguistic knowledge, since Quignard professes to not know 
Chinese or any foreign languages – other than Latin and Greek – the importance of which he 
emphasises. We may pause here and ask: should Quignard's statement be taken at face value? 
Is this actually an understatement of his linguistic knowledge, so that his erudition becomes 
also 'material for fiction' (Vuong 2016: 68) contributing to the Quignard's persona of the 
'docte ignorant' (à la Cusanus)? If, however, Quignard's statement is true, we may ask why 
Quignard has puzzlingly not made the effort to become more multilingual. His understanding 
of Chinese antiquity and other non-european cultures is compromised, for although a project 
such as translating Gongsun without knowing classical Chinese is telling as a literary and 
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translational experiment, his linguistic limitation undercuts the inspiration he draws from 
Gongsun. This problem can also be posed as: will the understanding of classical Chinese 
boost the reader's inspiration and pleasure from it or make no difference? The likely answer is 
that linguistic understanding should enhance the reader's experience, and that Quignard 
would find reading and creatively translating classical Chinese more rewarding if he learnt 
more Chinese. But we might also say no and take the view that understanding classical 
Chinese will not necessarily enhance the reader's experience of Chinese literature and provide 
more possibilities for inspiration, as when Gyung-Ryul Jang (1985: 353) argues that Pound is 
true in 'spirit' to Chinese aesthetics in Cathay not despite but 'because of his ignorance of the 
Chinese language'. If we take this view on Quignard too, however, then the linguistic medium 
itself – the very thing that Quignard emphasises – becomes negligible. In that case, what 
incentive would there be to learn any language other than one's own? 
 Nonetheless, stepping back from the above criticism, Quignard is in fact self-
consistently paradoxical in not learning Chinese and other foreign languages. According to 
his view that all languages are alienated from humanity and therefore foreign, French – 
supposedly his native language – is foreign to him just as Chinese is foreign, and is internally 
fractured by a schizology of different varieties and individual uses of French. By this logic, 
Quignard has always already been speaking, writing, thinking, and translating in a foreign 
language. Although this may set a bad example for his readers, or make Quignard easily 
dismissible to sinologists, seen from another perspective, it is also a contribution because 
Quignard highlights the illusion of linguistic continuity and inheritance. For if every language 
is foreign and there is no mother-tongue-versus-foreign-languages split, then cultural 
'insiders' do not necessarily have more access to the 'truth' about their tradition than cultural 
'outsiders'. Interestingly, this is precisely the view that recent scholars studying cultural 
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appropriation have maintained: e.g. Subha Xavier (2016) and Ileana Chirila (2017) both show 
that Chinese Francophone writers strategically use self-Orientalising images in their writings 
about Chinese culture; Xiaomei Chen (1992: 709) argues via the case-study of the anti-
nationalist Chinese TV series Heshang that 'it is a serious mistake to claim that a native self-
understanding is by nature more liberating or ''truer'' than the view of it constructed by its 
Other'; and James Young (2005) supports appropriative artistic and literary practices by 
cultural outsiders as long as the aim of appropriation is not to 'profoundly' offend, because 
misrepresentation does not necessarily arise from appropriation. If we relate Quignard's 
Chinese-inspired works to this questioning of the cultural insider/outsider split, we 
understand that Quignard has broader relevance outside Hexagonal French literature, for he 
reflects on the bigger question of how modern China and Chinese people connect with their 
own tradition. Quignard's radical rethinking of the relations between antiquity and 
contemporaneity, mother tongue and the alienation of human subjectivity through language 
brings out forcefully the problems with the facile view that language constitutes a continuous 
and unified cultural identity. In particular, Quignard's debatable French translations and 
appropriations of classical Chinese texts starkly pose the question of how we moderns can 
access and understand antiquity without distorting it through our perspectives and misusing it 
for our contemporary needs. This question is important for creative writers like Quignard as 
well as sinologists and modern Chinese people who are concerned about understanding their 
cultural tradition. Ancient Chinese culture and language, if not seriously studied, are very 
remote from contemporary China and difficult to access for Chinese people themselves. Here, 
Quignard's re-reading and re-writing of ancient Chinese literature and thought reveal that 
they cannot be directly transmitted but are necessarily fragmented and transformed over time, 
across different contexts, between diverse subjectivities and perspectives. Chinese antiquity – 
32 
 
all antiquities in fact – is not something out there for us to retrieve; it needs to be 
interrogated, reconstructed, and translated into our modern understanding, though always 
partially and imperfectly. Thus, Quignard's deliberate failure to grasp the historicity of 
Chinese antiquity shows indirectly that cultural traditions – even one's own – need to be 
learned rather than automatically inherited. If, according to Quignard, even one's own mother 
tongue needs to be questioned, only to reveal its fundamental foreignness and discontinuity 
from one's body and experience, then ancient languages such as classical Chinese would 
hardly justify any stereotyped cultural identification or inheritance that insists on a notion of 
transhistorical 'Chineseness'. In other words, for Quignard, a language is not the property of a 
certain people or culture, or provides a definition of any stable identity, or is a cultural label 
to be easily pinned to oneself. Although this view disrupts the feeling of cultural belonging 
and unity, it breaks down the Self-Other dichotomy and dislodges the belief that insiders 
necessarily occupy a more privileged position than outsiders in regard to understanding the 
former's culture, and have more authority or even ownership over its interpretations and 
debates.  
 Finally, the questionable linguistic knowledge and ahistoricism in Quignard's 
treatment of Chinese antiquity are precisely the aspects that affirm the recreative nature of his 
sinophilia: for being recreative is to play with one's sources, to create 'l'illusion linguistique' 
through a 'mise en jeu' of language (PT.VI: 145), and even assume a deceitful imposture of 
parody in experimental writing and translation. Consistent with his playful and 
decontextualising treatment of his ancient sources, Quignard is happy to be misunderstood 
and contradicted by his readers too, as he demonstrated at the Cerisy-la-Salle colloquium in 
2004.xvii Quignard's playful attitude towards writing that respects neither the original author 
nor the original text is also representative of the diffuse approach of contemporary writers 
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and artists who adopt an increasingly broad and comparative outlook on a multilingual and 
culturally hybrid world. This outlook typically involves a profusion of citations, keywords, 
and references that mimic internet search and hypertexts but are often insubstantial, 
misappropriating, delighting in eclecticism, and created for their word-cloud effect rather 
than intellectual depth. There is something of this spirit in Quignard's approach to Chinese 
antiquity, namely, the ludic and deliberately fictive way in which he recycles Chinese texts, 
philosophical thought and history, albeit always in notably reconstructed forms and without 
any claim to fidelity. In sum, parallel to keeping French interest in China alive and the 
disregard for – if not refusal of – the Orientalist fetishization of Chinese antiquity as a unique 
therapeutic alternative to Western modernity, there are also anti-historicist and creatively 
salvaging dimensions in Quignard's Chinese-inspired works. 
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, firstly, Quignard's case allows us to understand how he can be positioned within 
a literary practice that involves Sino-French intertextualities and therefore makes Hexagonal 
French literature inherently transcultural. Secondly, Quignard shows that Chinese antiquity is 
not only of interest and significance for modern China. Globalization means globalizing not 
only contemporary cultures and societies but also ancient cultures, or rather, the knowledge 
of ancient societies that spreads in a global context and is increasingly incorporated into 
discussions that compare the past with the contemporary to understand both better. Thirdly, 
Quignard's sinophilia reveals disrupture and fragmentation in the Chinese language and the 
identity and cultural unity it is supposed to sustain. We may ask to what extent can a modern 
people lay claims to an ancient culture, for example, when contemporary Chinese people 
claim to inherit a Chinese cultural identity over several thousand years of linguistic evolution, 
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shifts in intellectual development and social structure? Too often, the idea of tradition is 
employed in nationalist myths that serve to reinforce the power of a certain group or 
institution and refute criticism.xviii Lastly, by discrediting Orientalism through his generalist 
approach to China, Quignard simultaneously discredits Occidentalism and prompts us to see 
how it can be a reverse self-Orientalisation rather than real resistance to Eurocentric 
imperialism. Quignard's radical cultural egalitarianism thus offers a playful disregard for 
Orientalist stereotypes and challenges indirectly the manipulative use of antiquity in 
discourses about culture. It also encourages people to engage more with foreign cultures 
rather than think that cultures are self-enclosed entities that are shut to cultural 'outsiders'. 
Here I return to my argument for Quignard's relevance to Chinese studies, to re-
understanding China and Orientalist appropriation, as mentioned in the introduction. 
Quignard shows that the appropriation of the non-Western Other is not necessarily 
imperialist, nor should be considered insignificant by sweeping judgments about its 
'superficiality' à la Etiemble because of its distorted reflection of the Other. There is much to 
assert about Quignard's sinophilia, most importantly the fact that being interested in a foreign 
language and culture, despite not engaging with it as an epistemological quest, is still better 
than myopically refusing to go beyond one's own linguistic and cultural bubble. This is 
because, firstly, nothing is really distinctly and essentially Other; and secondly, as Geoffrey 
Lloyd emphasises (2015), taking an interest in the Other is the first step towards discovering 
one's own cultural biases and expanding one's horizons of understanding. This willingness to 
learn from the Other rather than its fetishization is therefore one of its most important 
messages that Quignard's Chinese inspirations communicate. 
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